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Abstract
Conventional wisdom tells us that with no market failure and local
non-satiation of preferences, the core is at least as large as the collection
of competitive equilibrium allocations. We con￿rm this for a standard
model featuring private ownership of land. Next we consider the public
land ownership version of the model. If the role of land ownership and
rent distribution is assumed by a government that ploughs back rent (at
least in excess of its agricultural value) to its citizens, the equilibrium
remains e¢ cient, but no longer need be in the core.
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11 Introduction
Consider a multi-commodity generalization of the Alonso (1964) model, the
workhorse of urban economic theory. The economy has land, the interval [0;1),
where the origin is the central business district or CBD. Each consumer must
commute to the CBD to work or to pick up their endowment of consumption
commodity. Only one consumer can be adjacent to the CBD. If his parcel is
[0;s), then the next consumer incurs transport cost ts, where t 2 R+ is the
commuting input per unit distance from the CBD in terms of consumption
good, as measured from the front of a person￿ s parcel. The other consumers
incur even greater commuting costs. Traders must use intervals of land. As
Berliant and Fujita (1992) have shown, any equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient.1
But what about the possibility of improving utility by forming a coalition?
The more land consumed by the agent closest to the CBD, the less land and the
less standard commodities are available for consumption (due to the increased
commuting cost of the consumers farther from the CBD). This observation
raises the question if there is an incentive to exclude one agent. In the next
section we demonstrate that the answer is negative for exchange economies
with privately owned land; a theorem shows that an equilibrium allocation
cannot be improved upon by any coalition. The subsequent section will reverse
the answer in the public land ownership model, where a public administration
owns land and distributes the rent.2 An equilibrium allocation is still e¢ cient
in the weak sense of Pareto, but can be improved upon by a subcoalition; it
might not be e¢ cient in the strong sense of belonging to the core.3
General equilibrium models of public ownership are rare. This is not with-
out reason. An important rationale for public ownership is the presence of
increasing returns to scale. Now with increasing returns, pro￿ts are maxi-
mized when the quantity supplied is in￿nite or zero and neither case generally
equilibrates with demand. Guesnerie (1975) has analyzed what happens if
public management of ￿rms with non-convex production technologies follows
the rule of marginal cost pricing (which is just the ￿rst order condition for
pro￿t maximization). A general equilibrium exists (under his conditions),
but need not be Pareto optimal.4 Basically, Guesnerie shows that the global
1See Berliant and LaFountain (forthcoming) for a graphical treatment.
2The public land ownership model is described in detail in Fujita (1986, section 1.2; 1989,
pp. 60-63) for the model of the New Urban Economics with a continuum of consumers. He
attributes its origins to Solow (1973).
3In fact, the core is empty for the example we provide.
4In fact, in Guesnerie￿ s model, all equilibria may be Pareto ine¢ cient.
2condition of pro￿t maximization is essential to the ￿rst welfare theorem. In
our analysis, however, this global condition is ful￿lled and the equilibrium is
Pareto optimal indeed. We have stumbled upon a more subtle complication
of public management: it is weakly e¢ cient (in the sense of Pareto), but not
strongly e¢ cient (in the sense of belonging to the core).
Our result is more subtle than the emptiness of the core of the three-
person voting game (Aumann, 1987). In such a game, the excluded player
gets nothing. Hence this player is willing to accept an arbitrarily small o⁄er, in
particular less than any of the two incumbent players receives. Consequently
the incumbents prefer to share with the outsider, rather than with each other.
In our model, however, an excluded player still gets her share of rent, so it is
harder to engage her in a coalition.
There are two points to be made relative to the recent literature on city
formation, for example Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002). First, we have
postulated in our work an exogenously given CBD. In most models of city
formation, the CBD or location of ￿rms is endogenous, and there is an explicit
agglomeration externality used to determine these locations. Thus, equilibria
are usually not e¢ cient, and thus not in the core. However, these models all
have embedded in them a model of consumer location and commuting, making
our analysis relevant. For example, conditional on the spatial distribution of
￿rms, one might want to consider the consumer location problem. Second, and
more importantly, the recipient and distribution of land rent in these models
is ill-de￿ned. The models are not closed in the sense of material balance, and
it is not speci￿ed who receives land rent. Our point here is that predictions
can be quite sensitive to how this part of the model is speci￿ed.
It is known that models with a continuum of agents, such as variants of
the standard monocentric city model of the New Urban Economics, can have
the property that equilibrium allocations are not e¢ cient and thus are not in
the core; see Berliant, Papageorgiou and Wang (1990). This phenomenon is
entirely due to the fact that there is a continuum of agents in the model. To
avoid this problem, we employ Alonso￿ s model. It features a ￿nite number of
discrete agents.
2 Exchange economies
Consider an exchange economy with l+1 commodities and I consumers indexed
by i with initial endowments comprised of land [￿i;￿i+￿i) and standard com-
3modities net of transport costs !i￿￿it 2 Rl
+ , where [￿1;￿1+￿1);:::;[￿I;￿I+￿I)
partition5 the world [0;1) and t 2 Rl
+ is the unit commuting input. The
consumers have preference relationships %i that are complete preorders on
R
l+1
+ ; only the quantity of land, e.g. ￿i, is assumed to matter, not the loca-
tion, e.g. ￿i. The quantity of land is taken to be the ￿rst commodity. A
preference relationship is called locally nonsatiated if every neighborhood of
any commodity bundle contains a strictly preferred commodity bundle. For-
mally, %i is locally nonsatiated if for every commodity bundle (￿i;xi) 2 R
l+1
+
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i) ￿ (￿i;xi) k< ￿. For example, the assumption that preferences are
strictly monotonic is stronger. In general, we use the notation zi to denote the
front or driveway location of the parcel used by consumer i. An allocation is a
vector of intervals and of consumption bundles ([zi;zi +si);xi ￿zit)I
i=1, where
for all i, xi ￿ zit. An allocation ([zi;zi + si);xi ￿ zit)I
i=1 is called feasible if
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￿i p(z)dm(z)+q￿!i. An equilibrium allocation
is the allocation component of an equilibrium.
A coalition is a subset S of f1;:::;Ig. For a coalition S, a coalition realloca-
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(for some i 2 S).
If this ￿no coalition reallocation￿condition holds for the grand coalition,
S = f1;:::;Ig, the feasible allocation is e¢ cient. A core allocation is clearly
e¢ cient, but an e¢ cient allocation need not be in the core.
We now adapt Theorem 1 of Debreu and Scarf (1963, attributed to Shapley)
to the generalized Alonso model.
5The formal de￿nition of a partition is given below in this paragraph.
4Generalized First Welfare Theorem: If preferences are locally nonsatiated,
then any equilibrium allocation is in the core.


























i p(z)dm(z) + q ￿ x0
i >
R ￿i+￿i
￿i p(z)dm(z) + q ￿ !i (for some i 2 S). By
local nonsatiation, for all " > 0 there are s"
i and x"
i within distance " from
s0
i and x0
i such that (s"
i;x"
i ￿z0








￿i p(z)dm(z)+q￿!i (for all i 2 S). By Lebesgue￿ s
dominated convergence theorem and continuity of the (linear) value function on










































￿i p(z)dm(z) + q ￿ !i]; that is
a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Remark: One may replace the equality in the material balance conditions
by a strict inequality, both in the de￿nition of equilibrium and of the core, but
then one must assume free disposal to obtain the Generalized First Welfare
Theorem.
Corollaries:
1. An equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient. (Take S = f1;:::;Ig.) This is the
First Welfare Theorem. It motivates the name of the Theorem above.
2. An equilibrium allocation is individually rational. (Take S = fig.)
3 Economies with public land ownership
In many papers6 land is not owned by the consumers, but by an absentee
landlord or a government. In this literature the absentee landlord or the
government is a broker between the farmers and the urban consumers, buying
land at the rent that prevails in agriculture and reselling it at a higher rate
to the consumers. Strictly speaking, this modeling approach is inconsistent
with the premises of neoclassical economics. Why would only the absentee
6See the surveys of Fujita (1986, 1989).
5landlord or the government be able to arbitrage between the farmers and the
urban consumers? Are farmers irrational? We circumvent this problem by
focusing on the so-called closed city model, where land is not purchased from
farmers but instead is owned by the absentee landlord or the government from
the outset.
Our model given in the previous section encompasses the situation with
an absentee landlord without modi￿cation. Simply endow one agent, who
obtains utility from consumption good but not from land, with all the land.
The generalized ￿rst welfare theorem applies. There is no incentive to exclude
a consumer by forming a coalition. True, the central consumer in￿ icts an
enormous opportunity cost on the other consumers, who all incur transport
cost in crossing his parcel. In equilibrium, however, this opportunity cost is
re￿ ected in the rent he pays. By excluding this consumer, the others can no
longer tap his initial wealth endowment. The gain of commuting cost reduction
is o⁄set by the loss of rent he contributes to the other agents, including the
landlord.
The situation with a government is di⁄erent. Index the government agent
by i = 0. It owns all the land, has no preferences (or equivalently is indi⁄erent
among all allocations), and redistributes rent to the consumers.7 What the
latter can achieve in terms of land and standard commodities, individually or
in a coalition, depends not only on the commodity endowment of the agents
involved, but also on rent and titles to rent, hence prices. Whereas in the pre-
ceding section the question of whether an equilibrium is in the core depended
only on the equilibrium allocation, it now also depends on prices and rent titles.
We may minimize this complication of the core concept by following the urban
economic postulate that there is only one non-land or ￿numeraire￿commodity
(l = 1). The price of this commodity is normalized to 1 (q = 1). Indeed, since
we merely want to show that an equilibrium need not be in the core, a simple
example is good enough. The de￿nition of equilibrium is modi￿ed by simple
inclusion of ￿i
R 1
0 p(z)dm(z) in the budget of consumer i, where (￿i)I
i=1 are the
exogenously given rent shares. A coalition without the government has no land
and, therefore, no potential to generate a superior assignment to its members if
land is an essential commodity. For a coalition with the government, f0g[S,
where S is a subset of f1;:::;Ig, a coalition reallocation is a vector of intervals
















i2S !i ￿ Rentleak. Here Rentleak is the rent
that leaks to nonmembers of the coalition. It is well-de￿ned only if we limit
coalition reallocations to equilibria for the economy consisting only of coali-
tion members; call an equilibrium price density for this sub-economy pS. This
limitation only makes our result in this section stronger, in the sense we ex-


















it) ￿i (si;xi ￿ zit) (for some i 2 S). Following Fujita (1989,
p. 60), we presume that rent is evenly divided among consumers, namely that
￿i = 1=I; i = 1;:::;I. The purpose of this section is to provide a simple
example where an equilibrium allocation is not in the core, and in fact we will
show that the core is empty. This result will be quite robust, in the following
sense. Alternatively one might model rent shares as coalition dependent, by
assuming that consumers who are excluded from a coalition with the govern-
ment have no title to the government rent proceeds. In this case Rentleak
is zero, so that the superior coalition reallocation we will construct remains
applicable (for our non-decreasing utility function). Our model and results
can accommodate any version of these property rights, from complete enforce-
ment of rent payments to consumers that are not members of a coalition to
the regime where consumers that are not members of a coalition have no right
to rent proceeds (or any intermediate regime with partial rights to land rent
shares).
With a government, the equilibrium is still e¢ cient. The proof is as
follows. For the grand coalition Rentleak is zero. Begin with an Alonso
economy with a government and public land ownership. Take the equilibrium
allocation we wish to test for e¢ ciency. Use this equilibrium allocation as the
initial endowments (including redistributed rent) for a new exchange economy
with the same I consumers but without the government. The equilibrium
allocation remains an equilibrium allocation in this new exchange economy
without the government but with altered initial endowments. The equilibrium
of the exchange economy is e¢ cient by Corollary 1 to the Generalized First
Welfare Theorem.
Surprisingly, an equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient but need not be in the
core. We will show this in the simplest case, I = f1;2g, with equal endow-
ments 1
8 < ! < 1:319 and equal preferences induced by the good-old utility
function ln(s)+x￿zt, where t ￿ 0:9231. As is well-known, quasi-linearity of
7the utility function renders the demand for land independent of the consump-
tion of numeraire for allocations with positive levels of numeraire consumption.
We will suppose without loss of generality for the remainder of the paper that
1 lives closer to the CBD than 2. The contract curve in this model is de￿ned
to be the set of Pareto optima such that 1￿ s marginal rate of substitution is
equal to 2￿ s marginal rate of substitution plus t. This is the analog of the
equality of marginal rates of substitution in the standard general equilibrium
model, and it is also the Muth (1969)-Mills (1972) condition for the Alonso
model.8 The familiar intuition is that at an optimum, if this equality does
not hold, then a Pareto dominating feasible allocation can be found as fol-
lows. If 1￿ s marginal rate of substitution is greater than 2￿ s marginal rate
of substitution plus t, then 1￿ s land parcel can be made slightly larger and 2￿ s
land parcel made slightly smaller, covering the increased commuting cost for
2 and generating a surplus of numeraire. Of course, an analogous argument
can be made if the inequality is reversed. Given the functional form of utility,
the contract curve features land consumption independent of composite good
consumption for each of the two consumers. It is determined by the equation:
1
s1 = 1
1￿s1 + t,9 where we use the assumption that total endowment of land is





As already discussed, a ￿rst welfare theorem holds in this model, so we
can use the contract curve and s￿ to solve for an equilibrium. A candidate
equilibrium price is given by p(z) = 1
s￿ for 0 ￿ z ￿ s￿, p(z) = 1
s￿ ￿￿￿(z ￿s￿)
for s￿ ￿ z ￿ 1, where ￿￿ will be determined by the equal treatment condition,
namely that the two consumers (who have the identical endowments and utility
functions) are at the same utility level in equilibrium.10 The appendix contains
8See Berliant and Fujita (1992) and Berliant and LaFountain (forthcoming).
9As discussed in detail in Berliant and Fujita (1992) and Berliant and LaFountain (forth-
coming), the contract curve in the Alonso model can be described in a modi￿ed Edgeworth
box.
10Mirrlees (1972) and Wildasin (1986) discuss how consumers with identical endowments
and utility functions can have di⁄erent utility levels at a utilitarian optimum. However, at
an equilibrium allocation, consumers with the same endowments and utility functions must
be at the same utility level, though they don￿ t necessarily consume the same bundles. Even
though equilibrium allocations in our model are e¢ cient, they are not necessarily utilitarian
optimal. Notice also that core generally does not require that identical consumers are at the
same utility level, and that core and utilitarian optima are not necessarily related. Finally,
the utility possibilities frontier is symmetric in our model when consumers are identical.
The proximate cause of the empty core in the public ownership model is the relationship
between the utility possibility frontiers of the grand coalition on the one hand and the
coalitions consisting of one consumer and the government on the other.
8the tedious algebraic details of calculations su¢ cient to show that this is in
fact an equilibrium rent density. The intuition is that for the innermost
consumer, the price is equal to their marginal willingness to pay for land given
an allocation of land on the contract curve. The rent density on the outer
consumer￿ s parcel must exceed the inner consumer￿ s marginal willingness to
pay for more land. It must also decline more slowly than commuting cost, so
the inner consumer has no incentive to shift its parcel outward. Finally, the
outer consumer￿ s marginal willingness to pay for land must exceed the rent
density at each point, so they buy the entire parcel. The functional form for
price density we have chosen is the simplest that has all of these features.
Next, we show that this equilibrium is not in the core. To see this, consider
the coalition of the government and one consumer, say f0;1g: This coalition
has at its disposal the endowments of both the government and consumer 1.
Thus, consumer 1 gets all of the land and its own endowment of composite
good; it pays no commuting cost, but must pay half the total rent to consumer
2. Then the utility level of consumer 1 becomes ln(1)+!￿ 1
2Rent ￿ !=2: So
the equilibrium does not belong to the core if !=2 > ln(s￿) + ! + 1
2s￿ ￿ 1 or
! < 2￿2ln(s￿)￿ 1
s￿: For t = 0:9231; s￿ = 0:39018 and the upper bound reads






4+t2 < 0. Since the upper bound is increasing
in s￿, hence decreasing in t, it follows that 1
8 ￿ ! < 1:319 guarantees that for
t ￿ 0:9231, the equilibrium allocation does not belong to the core.
The intuition behind this result is that for a range of parameters, the equi-
librium is characterized by high rent collections from the innermost consumer
and thus large transfers to the outermost consumer. Notice that the utility
that can be achieved for a consumer in a coalition of the consumer and the
government is independent of commuting cost, since the consumer enjoys all
of the land and pays no commuting cost. Hence, the coalition of the govern-
ment and the innermost consumer could block by using an equilibrium rent
density that is relatively low so that rent collections and transfers to the other
consumer are also low. In essence, the additional utility provided to the inner-
most consumer by adding at least half the total land endowment to his bundle
combined with a lower rent transfer to consumer 2 yield higher utility.
In fact, the core is empty for this example. To see this, suppose that the
core is nonempty. We proved toward the beginning of this section that any
equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient, so this applies to the equilibrium allocation
we have found for our example. Thus, some consumer is as well o⁄ or worse
o⁄ in the core allocation compared with the equilibrium allocation. The
9coalition of this mistreated consumer and the public authority can block the
core allocation using the argument in the preceding paragraphs. So we have a
contradiction, and the core is empty. This argument applies generally to the
model with two identical consumers, so if any equilibrium allocation is not in
the core, then the core is empty.
4 Conclusion
Although land is an indivisible commodity and its use in￿ icts extra commuting
costs on more remotely located consumers, the market does not fail. More-
over, there is no incentive for a subgroup of consumers to form a coalition.
This result holds for private ownership economies with land, possibly featur-
ing an absentee landlord. For an economy with public land ownership where a
government returns rent (at least in excess of its agricultural value) to its cit-
izens, the equilibrium remains basically the same and, in particular, e¢ cient,
but becomes vulnerable to a coalition of the government and a subgroup of
the citizens, even if the rent titles of the excluded citizens are honored. There
is an incentive to keep the population small. This idea goes beyond the fa-
miliar notion in the literature on local public goods that wealthy communities
use exclusionary zoning to bar poor residents in order to preserve their tax
base. In our model we have no taxes, and thus a government has no tax base
to preserve. Our argument employs the government only as a redistributive
mechanism, similar to its use in some versions of the second welfare theorem.
With multiple governments, we are likely to simply have replicas of the our
basic example and arguments, as the governments are indi⁄erent about al-
location, and thus have no reason to compete. The idea even goes beyond
Hadar, Hochman and Pines (2004) who show that a laisser-faire city may have
suboptimal size. In their model, the equilibrium is not Pareto e¢ cient.
The bottom line is that competitive equilibrium might not be the proper
solution concept in the sense of predicting outcomes under public land owner-
ship.
It is important to note that our example and arguments all apply when
t = 0, that is when there is no commuting cost and the model is aspatial.
Thus, it applies to models with public ownership in general. What is crucial
to our argument is that there is an agent endowed with all of one commodity
that pays out rent proceeds from the use of this commodity to other agents in
terms of other goods. But well-known problems arise in such models with the
10de￿nition of the core. For example, in a standard general equilibrium model
with production and exogenous pro￿t shares, if the ￿rms can make positive
pro￿ts in equilibrium (for example, if they are not endowed with constant
returns to scale technologies), then what a ￿rm does in a coalition is not
internalized within the coalition. Coalition production economies can help
address this problem, though these models are not quite analogous to ours,
where there is no production or pro￿t.
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5 Appendix
Consumer 1 pays rent 1
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1
s￿ ￿ 1) (1)
To begin the proof, we ￿rst show that there is a ￿￿ 2 ( 1￿2s￿
s￿(1￿s￿)2; 1
s￿) such that
u1 ￿ u2 = 0 by using the intermediate value theorem. For ￿ = 1￿2s￿
s￿(1￿s￿)2;
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12We claim that this expression is positive for 0 < t < 2. In fact, we prove that
each bracketed expression is positive. To begin, consider the ￿rst bracketed
expression. Notice that 4+t2 ￿ 4+t2+ t4
16, so
p
4 + t2 <
q
4 + t2 + t4
16 ￿ 2+ t2
4 ,
and therefore multiplying both sides by 2+t, (2+t)
p
4 + t2 ￿ 4+2t+ t2
2 + t3
4 .




2 , and thus (2+t)
p
4 + t2 < 4+2t+t2,
or 2t > (2 + t)
p
4 + t2 ￿ 4 ￿ t2. Division of both sides by 2 + t ￿
p
4 + t2
(which is positive as (2+t)2 = 4+t2+4t > 4+t2, 2+t >
p
4 + t2) establishes






2 . The second
bracketed term, t
2 ￿ ln( 2t
2+t￿
p
4+t2 ￿ 1), is also positive as we will prove now.
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4 + t2￿2) > 0, this expression
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p
4 + t2 ￿ t). Expanding and collecting terms, this inequality is
4
p
4 + t2 ￿ t2 ￿ 8 < 0, which is true.
For ￿ = 1
s￿; p(1) = 1 and, substituting s￿ = 2+t￿
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2t into equation (1),
u1 ￿u2 = 1
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1 ￿ ln( 2t
2+t￿
p
4+t2 ￿ 1). This expression is negative if t ￿ 0:9231. Then, by
the intermediate value theorem, there is a ￿￿ 2 ( 1￿2s￿
s￿(1￿s￿)2; 1
s￿) such that the
utility levels match. The marginal willingness to pay for land of consumer
2 must be greater than or equal to the price:11 1
z￿s￿ ￿ 1
s￿ ￿ ￿(z ￿ s￿) or
z￿s￿
s￿ ￿ ￿￿(z ￿ s￿)2 ￿ 1. The left hand side of this inequality is initially 0,
that is for z = s￿: The derivative of the left hand side of the inequality,
1
s￿ ￿ 2￿￿(z ￿ s￿); is nonnegative and remains nonnegative as long as z < s￿+
1
2￿￿s￿ which is automatic for z ￿ 1. Consequently the left hand side of the
inequality is maximal for z = 1: It follows that the marginal willingness to
pay for land of consumer 2 exceeds price if 1￿s￿
s￿ ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ s￿)2 ￿ 1, which is
true for ￿￿ ￿ 1￿2s￿
s￿(1￿s￿)2:
11It might seem as though the marginal willingness to pay of consumer 2 should be required
to be equal to price at the right endpoint of the city, 1. However, we are using a closed
model here, so the right endpoint of the city is not variable. For example, there could be a
lake beginning at 1. Thus, even though marginal willingness to pay exceeds price at 1, the
consumer cannot buy land beyond 1. This is very similar to general equilibrium models
with di⁄erentiated, indivisible objects.
13In order to verify that this is really an equilibrium, we must show that
composite good consumption is non-negative. We claim that this is true if
! ￿ 1
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